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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2a-
3(2)(h) (2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in concluding that gifts made to Mr. Kunzler as his sole and 
separate property were marital assets subject to equitable distribution? 
Standard of Review:'" A trial court has considerable discretion considering property 
[division] in a divorce proceeding, thus its actions enjoy a presumption of validity.'" Alexin v. 
Alexin, 2006 UT App 405, f 16,147 P.3d 464 (quoting Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83, H 17,45 
P.3d 176 (alteration in original)). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional or statutory provisions that are determinative on this 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
After a marriage of 22 years, Petitioner/Appellee/Cross-Appellant Allison Q. Kunzler ("Ms. 
Kunzler") filed a petition for divorce on April 24, 2003. (R. 1-4). The trial court entered an order 
granting the parties a bifurcated divorce on October 27,2004, but reserved all of the remaining issues 
for a later trial setting. (R. 744-58). The parties then pursued additional discovery, after which the 
trial court scheduled a trial to take place on August 17,2005. (R. 1231 A: trial transcript, hereinafter 
referred to as TT1 at 1-195 and TT2 at 1-158). The trial was held on August 17 and August 18, 
2005, and on August 24,2005, the trial court announced its decision on all pending issues (R. 940-
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52). On March 15,2006, the court announced an additional memorandum decision on the issues that 
had been presented, (R. 1103-07), and then on April 6, 2006, the trial court signed a Supplemental 
Decree of Divorce (R. 1167-90) and its first "Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law," (R. 1128-66). On August 17, 2006, the court again announced and entered a Memorandum 
Decision supplementing its earlier decisions, (R. 1283-91), which was then memorialized in its 
Amended Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (R. 1337-77), and its Amended 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce, (R. 1378-1403). Appellant Alan Kunzler ("Mr. Kunzler") filed 
his Notice of Appeal on December 18, 2007. (R. 1425-27). 
BACKGROUND 
The parties married on April 4,1981 (R. 1129). They decided that Mr. Kunzler should return 
to his family's Park Valley, Utah, ranch to assist his parents and work the ranch and Ms. Kunzler 
came with him. During the marriage, the parties lived in Park Valley, Utah (R. 1135), a remote area 
of Box Elder County, and they had seven children, only four of which were minors at the time of the 
divorce, (R. 1131). Prior to the marriage, Mr. Kunzler had obtained an interest in real property (the 
"Kingston Property") with his father, which devolved to Mr. Kunzler upon the death of his father. 
(R. 1141). 
During the marriage, Mr. Kunzler's mother, Bernice, in an effort to limit the tax implication 
that her children might experience upon her death, began gifting various properties to her children. 
(TT2 at 68). Much like his siblings, Mr. Kunzler received gifts of property from his mother, 
starting in 1987 (the "Manning Property"). Thereafter, in 1989, Mr. Kunzler received another gift 
from Bernice (the "Pritchett Property") (R. 1141), followed by a gift in 1992 (the "Carey Property" 
and the "Booth Lemdeco Property") (R. 1143,1144), and finally in 1995 (the "Dreyfiiss Property"), 
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(R. 1145). Bernice was motivated by the substantial tax costs that she had incurred following her 
husband's death, which prompted her to develop an estate plan featuring certain inter vivos gifts of 
property to her children during her lifetime. (TT2 at 68, 71). Mr. Kunzler worked the ranch 
throughout the marriage, and Ms. Kunzler stayed home and cared for the children and the needs of 
the home. (TTl at 76). No substantive modifications were ever made to these properties, and Mr. 
Kunzler treated the properties as if they were part of the ranch, and used the land to service certain, 
very low tech requirements of the ranch. (TTl at 129-31). Thus, none of the properties that Bernice 
gifted to him were subject to any material improvements or development. (Id). 
At the time that Ms. Kunzler filed her petition for divorce, nothing concerning these 
properties had changed, and Mr. Kunzler remained the record holder of title. (R. 1139). However, 
at trial, Ms. Kunzler, after conceding that the properties had been given to Mr. Kunzler as his 
separate property, asked the court to award her an interest in each of these properties. (TTl at 3). 
The trial court, after hearing the evidence, although the issue was never squarely presented to the 
court, decided that Mr. Kunzler's interest in the property resulted from earnings, but only because 
Mr. Kunzler is a rancher. (R. 1140). 
Specifically, the court found: 
e. The court finds the daughters and sons who have chosen to make their careers in the 
city will have benefits from their employment including 40IK plans or 
pension/retirement plans. The only pension or retirement which most farmers and 
ranchers have is the value of the land which they have acquired. The Court therefore 
finds it makes great sense that those who have stayed and worked the ranch receive 
a greater share. The greater share is not truly a gift, rather it is something that has 
been earned. The Respondent touched briefly on this concept of gift vs. entitlement 
in his own testimony. Specifically, the Respondent referred to a saddle which had 
been given by him to one of the parties' sons and then Respondent corrected himself 
and said, "It wasn't really even a gift, he had earned it." 
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f. The Court finds the interest which had been "earned" during the marriage ought to 
be considered a marital asset just the same as any pension which might be divisible 
under the Woodward formula. 
(R. 1140). Mr. Kunzler now appeals. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The trial court erred in concluding that the properties at issue here were not gifts, but were 
instead earnings, and thus part of the marital estate. Awarding Ms. Kunzler any portion of Mr. 
Kunzler's separate interests in the Prichett Property, the Carey Property, the Booth Lemdeco 
Property, the Dreyfuss Property, and the Manning Property, is wholly unsupported by the evidence. 
Admittedly, Mr. Kunzler received his interest in these properties during his marriage to Ms. Kunzler, 
but the nature of the transactions that resulted in his receiving the interests, and all of the evidence 
presented to the trial court concerning these transactions, centered on Bernice Kunzler's desire to 
gift the property to Mr. Kunzler as his sole and separate property. Ms. Kunzler introduced no 
evidence to the trial court that even suggested that Mr. Kunzler's interest in these properties resulted 
from earnings, or that the gifts from Bernice Kunzler should be viewed as earnings. 
Furthermore, assuming that the trial court erred in its characterization of the property as 
resulting from earnings, Ms. Kunzler offered the court no evidence that would have supported a 
conclusion that the property had been transmuted through either the actions of Mr. Kunzler or the 
actions of Ms. Kunzler. No evidence was ever submitted to the court that Mr. Kunzler commingled 
the property in any way: he did not gift an interest in the properties to Ms. Kunzler; her did not use 
marital funds to purchase or improve the properties; and he made no promises to Ms. Kunzler, or 
anyone else, that would have led them to believe that he ever intended the property to be converted 
into marital property. 
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Furthermore, Ms. Kunzler offered the court no evidence that she had ever even been to the 
properties at issue here. Nothing presented to the court suggested that she had added any value to 
the land, that she had improved the land in any way, or that she had made any efforts to protect the 
land in any way. Instead, the only evidence relevant to this question indicated that Ms. Kunzler 
stayed home and cared for the parties' children, and that she spent little to no time on the ranch itself. 
Utah law makes clear that prior to dividing property in a divorce case, a trial court is required 
to determine whether the property is either marital or separate. Once this distinction is made, in the 
absence of certain unique circumstances, trial courts are then directed to award all separate property 
to the owner and to divide the marital property equitably between the parties. Here, in the absence 
of any evidence supporting its decision, the court erred in concluding that the property at issue was 
part of the marital estate and in awarding Ms. Kunzler any interest in the property. 
Accordingly, because no evidence supports the trial court's award to Ms. Kunzler of an 
interest in Mr. Kunzler's separate real property, i.e., his interests the Prichett Property, the Carey 
Property, the Booth Lemdeco Property, the Dreyfuss Property, and the Manning Property, this court 
should reverse the trial court's award and direct the trial court to return to Mr. Kunzler all of his 
interests in these separate properties. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING MR. KUNZLER'S 
SEPARATE PROPERTY TO MS. KUNZLER IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY 
EVIDENCE THAT THE PROPERTY HAD CHANGED IN CHARACTER 
This Court should reverse the trial court's ruling awarding Ms. Kunzler a marital interest in 
the Property that Mr. Kunzler's mother had transferred to him, as a gift, during his marriage to Ms. 
Kunzler, because the trial court was presented with no evidence to support its conclusions. During 
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the marriage, Mr. Kunzler was gifted several parcels of property in his own name, and in the name 
of him and his brothers. This property exists within the boundaries of the ranch that their parents 
built and is utilized by the ranch for its operations. Ms. Kunzler never offered the court even a single 
piece of evidence that would suggest that the property had been gifted to the parties, or that some 
conduct of the parties during the marriage changed the character of the property from separate 
property into marital property. Further, Ms. Kunzler also submitted no evidence that would support 
the court's finding that Mr. Kunzler's interest in these properties was actually earnings and not a gift 
from his mother. 
However, following the trial, the trial court found that the property was derived from 
earnings, and thus was marital, and it entered an order awarding Ms. Kunzler half of Mr. Kunzler's 
fractional interest in several of the parcels, and it did so without reference to any evidence that would 
have supported the award. In doing so, the trial court erred, and this court should reverse the award 
and return Mr. Kunzler's separate property to him. 
"Transmutation of nonmarital property is a matter of intent to be gleaned from the facts of 
each case." 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 510. "Inherited or donated property, as well 
as its appreciated value, is generally regarded as separate from the marital estate and hence is left 
with the receiving spouse in a property division incident to divorce." Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 
1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Further, "as a general rule, 'property acquired by one spouse by gift and 
inheritance during the marriage [should be awarded] to that spouse, together with any appreciation 
or enhancement of its value.'" Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 3734 23,993 P.2d 887 (quoting 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304,308 (Utah 1988)). "There are some exceptions to this rule, 
but if none of the exceptions apply, the trial court must . . . ensure that any interest on, or 
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appreciation of Husband's [separate] property is regarded as his separate property rather than as 
property acquired during the marriage." In re Oxalic, 2005 UT App 234, f 26,114 P.3d 1164 (Ore, 
J., concurring). Thus, it is accepted in Utah that "equity requires that each party retain the separate 
property he or she brought into [or received during] the marriage." Hammond v. Hammond, 760 
P.2d 421, 424 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
However, as earlier indicated, this doctrine is inapplicable should a court determine that the 
property has changed in character due to the application of one of the very few exceptions available 
to change separate property into marital property. First, Utah courts have determined that the 
separate property transmutes into marital property if "'the other spouse has by his or her efforts or 
expense contributed to the enhancement, acquiring an equitable interest in it.'" Bradford, 1999 UT 
App 373 at^ f 23 (quoting Martinson, 760 P.2d at 308). Second, separate property will be transmuted 
into marital property if "'the property has been consumed or its identity lost through commingling 
or exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest in the other spouse'" 
Id. (alteration in original). Finally, should neither of the aforementioned conditions apply, the trial 
court may also award separate property to the non-owning spouse in unique cases, but only if the 
court considers the following elements and finds them to favor such an award: 
"The amount and kind of property to be divided, the source of the 
property, the parties' health, the parties' standard of living and 
respective financial conditions, their needs and earning capacities, the 
duration of the marriage, and the relationship the property has with 
the amount of alimony awarded." 
Hammond, 793 P.2d at 425 (quoting Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). 
Regardless of the trial court's eventual decision concerning the distribution of property, courts 
should first properly categorize the parties' property as part of the marital estate or as separate 
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property of one or the other. See Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1323 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
However, the trial court's property and debt allocation must be based on adequate findings and 
"fail[ure] to enter specific, detailed findings supporting its financial determinations," Hall v. Hall, 
858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) constitutes an abuse of discretion that amounts to 
reversible error unless the facts in the record are 'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting 
only a finding in favor of the judgment. '"Hammond, 793 P.2d at 425 (citation omitted). 
Here, following the two day trial, the trial court concluded that Mr. Kunzler's interests in 
the Prichett Property, the Carey Property, the Booth Lemdeco Property, the Dreyfiiss Property, and 
the Manning Property were not separate interests, but were instead marital interests.1 A simple 
review of the evidence submitted to the trial court reveals that the court's decision was not based 
upon the evidence.2 Ms. Kunzler offered the testimony of herself and her expert; however, only Ms. 
Kunzler touched upon the issue of Mr. Kunzler's separate Property. Additionally, Ms. Kunzler 
questioned both Bernice and Mr. Kunzler concerning the properties, their transfer to Mr. Kunzler, 
and the uses that the property had been put to following the transfer. The trial court, however, found 
1
 To the extent that the court's conclusion is instead viewed as a finding of fact, Mr. 
Kunzler recognizes his responsibility to marshal all of the evidence before the court that supports 
the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence does not support the findings. See Martinez v. 
Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2007 UT 42, f^ 36, 164 P.3d 
384 (stating "[t]o aid the appellate court in conducting a whole record review, the party 
challenging the factual findings must marshal all of the evidence and demonstrate that, despite 
the facts supporting the decision, the "'findings are not supported by substantial evidence'" 
(citation omitted). 
2
 Appellant's counsel is painfully aware of the duty to marshal all of the evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings and that the only permissible attack on the findings must be 
predicated on the sufficiency of this evidence alone. However, in the absence of any evidence 
supporting the trial court's conclusion, and in the absence of a finding that refers back to any 
relevant evidence in the record, Appellant's counsel is left only with the evidence that was 
presented to the trial court, and presents his argument through this evidence. 
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that Mr. Kunzler's interest in this property was the result of earnings, and not a gift, and that 
therefore his interest in this property was a martial interest, not a separate interest. (R. 1140). In an 
effort to support this finding, the court opined that "[t]he only pension or retirement which most 
farmers and ranchers have is the value of the land which they have acquired. The Court therefore 
finds it makes sense that those who have stayed and worked the ranch deserve a greater share. The 
greater share is not truly a gift, rather is is something that has been earned." (R. 1140). Taken at 
its face value, the trial court's "finding" is actually an opinion or a conclusion, and not a finding of 
fact at all. However, even if this court views the trial court's statement as an actual finding, the 
record is barren of evidence that would support it. That testimony can be summarized as follows:3 
During her examination of Mr. Kunzler, Ms. Kunzler's counsel asked him 
whether the gifts were actually "in lieu of services" (TT1 at 124), and whether 
Bernice Kunzler's gift was made because Mr. Kunzler and his brothers were working 
the ranch (TT1 at 125). However, in either case, the responses to these inquiries 
yielded no evidence that could be used to support the conclusion that the gifts were 
actually earnings. (TT1 at 124-25). 
In contrast, Ms. Kunzler testified that she never had held any real estate in her 
own name, (TT1 at 100), and she agreed that all of the property that Mr. Kunzler had 
received during the marriage he received in his own name, and jointly with his 
brothers (TT1 at 16-18). 
3
 Because the trial court made a global finding that Mr. Kunzler's interests in these 
properties were the result of earnings, not a gift, it is unnecessary to address the facts related to 
each property seperately. Instead, Appellant will attempt to summarize the evidence related to 
the trial court's decision as a whole. 
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Mr. Kunzler testified that the Properties were gifted to him for "tax reasons," 
(TTl at 105). He further explained that the Properties were used from time to time 
to run Kunzler ranch cattle (TTl at 107-08). He later identified the property gift as 
part of Bernice's estate planning process (TT2 at 101) and stated that he had never 
contributed any money to the Pritchett Property purchase (TT2 at 102) and that the 
Pritchett Property was purchased in his name and the name of his brothers. (TT2 at 
102-03). 
Jodi McFall testified that Bernice purchased all of the gifted properties, (TT2 
at 27) and that Bernice had paid all of the real estate taxes on the gifted Property 
(TT2 at 29). Ms. McFall also testified that Bernice had never gifted any of the land 
that she had purchased to anyone other than her children and that she had specifically 
excluded her children's spouses when gifting the property to the children. (TT2 at 
32). Additionally, Ms. McFall testified that the property that Bernice was gifting to 
her non-ranch working children, and that was contained in an L.L.C. designed to 
devolve to those children, "was worth substantially more than property in Park 
Valley." (TT2at40). 
Bernice Kunzler testified that when her husband died, soon after the parties 
to this action married, each of her children received a 1/96 interest in the Kunzler 
ranch as an inheritance. (TT2 at 67), and that after his death, Bernice had made an 
effort to gift to each of the children the maximum value permitted under the law and 
that she had done so in an effort to execute her estate plan. (TT2 at 68). Bernice also 
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testified that she had paid for the property (TT2 at 71-72) and that she had never 
gifted any property to any of the spouses of her children (TT2 at 73). 
In section 8 its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, entitled Real Property,4 
the trial court addressed its treatment of the properties at issue in the instant appeal. (R. 1139). In 
this section, the court found that the gifted property had been acquired by Mr. Kunzler and titled in 
his own name and that all of the funds expended in purchasing these properties were donated by 
Bernice Kunzler. (R. 1139). The court then found that Bernice's income resulted from the labors 
of Mr. Kunzler and his brothers,5 and that Bernice had rewarded her children who stayed to work on 
the ranch differently than the children who had not, (R. 1140). The court then concluded that not 
only was Bernice's decision to vest Mr. Kunzler and his brothers with a greater interest in the ranch 
reasonable, but that it was not a gift, but was instead earnings. (R. 1140). Based on these findings, 
the court concluded that the Pritchett Property, the Carey Property, the Booth Lemdeco Property, the 
Dreyfuss Property, and the Manning Property were marital property. 
All of the evidence presented to the trial court is contrary to both the finding that the gifts 
were actually earnings and that the property in question was marital. Bernice Kunzler testified that 
4
 Because neither party had acquired any interest in real property during the marriage, 
other than the gifts that had been made to Mr. Kunzler, the trial court's discussion of real 
property was expressly limited to those properties that had been gifted to Mr. Kunzler. 
5
 The materiality of this fact is, at best, unclear. It can be said with a high degree of 
confidence that all employers require the work of their employees to guarantee the flow of 
income into the employer's coffers. Such efforts do not convert "gifts" into "earnings," merely 
because the gift comes from the employer, and the fact that Bernice Kunzler has made, and 
continues to make, similar gifts to all of her children, including those who do not contribute to 
the ranch, and her income, contradicts the trial court's conclusion that the gifts from Bernice 
should be categorized as earnings. 
11 
the gifts to Mr. Kunzler, and his brothers, were gifts intended to further her estate plan, and that they 
were made inter vivos merely to avoid the tax consequences that Bernice Kunzler had suffered at the 
time of her husband's death. (TT2 at 67-68). Bernice was careful never to gift property to either Mr. 
Kunzler or his siblings that exceeded the federal income tax exception for gifts. (TT2 at 68). 
Further, Bemice also testified that she had gifted property to all of her children, and that the value 
of the annual gifts, and the entire value, i.e., dollar amount, of the gifts to the children over the life 
of the gifts was identical, but that she could not predict the future value of the property that had been 
gifted. (TT2 at 92). 
Ms. Kunzler introduced no evidence that even suggested that Bemice's testimony should be 
discounted, or that it was inaccurate. Instead, Ms. Kunzler directed the court to Berenice Kunzler's 
transcript testimony concerning her estate plan. There, she was asked: 
Why was there a decision to split up - to have your daughters and 
Dean (her son who no longer works on the ranch) receive or deal with 
the Cache County Property and then you had your other three boys 
remain in the Park Valley property? Why was that decision made? 
Bemice Kunzler responded that: 
Well, it just seemed the thing to do. They grew up there. These kids 
were in town. It as an easier way to separate it. 
This information, however, addressed not the gifts that were being made to Bemice Kunzler's 
children, but instead her estate plan, which involved the formation of two L.L.C.s, one vested with 
the Cache County property, created for the benefit of the children who did not work on the ranch, 
and the other vested with the Park Valley property, which was intended to benefit Mr. Kunzler and 
his brothers who worked the ranch. (TT2 at 76-77). The trial court received no other evidence that 
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even remotely supported its determination that Bernice Kunzler's gifts to Mr. Kunzler were earnings, 
and not gifts. Therefore, this finding is clearly erroneous and must be reversed. 
In the absence of any evidence that would support the court's finding that Bernice's gifts to 
Mr. Kunzler were earnings, the trial court was required to then examine the evidence that had been 
presented to it to determine if the properties' character as separate property had been transmuted. 
See Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1323. To do so, the court was required to examine the evidence to determine 
whether Mr. Kunzler had commingled any of the Property with the marital estate, or if evidence had 
been submitted suggesting that Ms. Kunzler had, through '"her efforts or expense contributed to the 
enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property.'" Bradford, 1999 UT App 373 at ^ 23 
(quoting Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308). The trial court's findings do not even address these elements, 
because the court had concluded that Bernice's gifts to Mr. Kunzler were actually earnings, and that 
as earnings, they were part of the marital estate. (R. 1140). However, had the court reviewed the 
evidence for these factors, it would have been forced to conclude that none of Mr. Kunzler's interest 
in these properties had transmuted. 
Ms. Kunzler introduced no evidence that the property had been commingled, and in fact, she 
conceeded that she had not had any property titled in her name during the course of the marriage. 
(TT1 at 100). Instead, the court had evidence that Bernice had gifted the properties to Mr. Kunzler, 
as his sole and separate property, with the intent of keeping all of the property in the control of her 
children. (TT2 at 73). Thus, the only evidence before the court on this issue was that Mr. Kunzler 
had been gifted the property, but that he had left it within the ranch and acted as if it were merely 
ranch property held in his name, precluding any possible conclusion that Mr. Kunzler had 
commingled his interests in the property with the marital estate. 
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Ms. Kunzler also failed to introduce any evidence that she had contributed, in any way, to 
the enhancement, maintenance, or protection of the properties at issue. In a possible effort to 
demonstrate contribution, Ms. Kunzler testified that while Mr. Kunzler worked the ranch, a job that 
often kept him away from home for long stretches of time, she took care of all of the "household 
issues," including the care of the parties' children. (TTl at 76). She also testified that she had 
regularly laundered Mr. Kunzler's clothing when he would ship it back home while he was working 
in remote locations of the ranch, and then she would send the laundered clothing back to Mr. 
Kunzler. (TTl at 76). Further, Mr. Kunzler testified that the property at issue was used solely for 
grazing and feeding the ranch's cattle (TT1 at 115,121), and that the only work done on the property 
involved "disking," "seeding," "burning," placing "tardon pellets," and the construction of a drinking 
pond on one parcel to allow the cattle easier access to water. (TTl at 129-31). In other words, none 
of the property at issue here has been improved to any great extent, and there was no evidence 
presented to the trial court that would support a finding that Ms. Kunzler contributed to these 
properties in any way. Consequently, the trial court would have erred in entering such a finding, and 
this court would have no basis to conclude that such a finding would be supported in the record. 
In short, the trial court erred in concluding that Mr. Kunzler's interests in the Prichett 
Property, the Carey Property, the Booth Lemdeco Property, the Dreyfuss Property, and the Manning 
Property were the result of his earnings - a marital asset - and not a gift from Bernice Kunzler. Each 
of these properties was gifted to Mr. Kunzler as his separate property, and these gifts mirrored the 
gifts that Bernice Kunzler provided to each of her children. Further, no evidence was introduced at 
trial that would have supported a trial court concluding that Mr. Kunzler's separate interests in these 
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properties had transmuted to marital properties, and as a result, this court should reverse the trial 
court's award decision to award Ms. Kunzler an interest in these properties. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in granting Ms. Kunzler any portion of Mr. Kunzler separate property, 
which was gifted to him, in his own name, by his mother. Because the court's determination that 
Mr. Kunzler's interest in these properties is contrary to the facts of this case, and Utah law, the 
court's distribution is unsupported and should not be upheld. 
Accordingly, this court should reverse the trial court's decision to award her this property and 
instead vest all of Mr. Kunzler's separate property in him. 
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